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ABSTRACT
First-year insurer participation in the Health Insurance Marketplaces (HIMs) established
by the Affordable Care Act is limited in many areas of the country. There are 3.9 partic-
ipants, on (population-weighted) average, in the 395 ratings areas spanning the 34 states
with federally facilitated marketplaces (FFMs). Using data on the plans offered in the
FFMs, together with predicted market shares for HIM participants (estimated using 2011
insurer-state market shares in the individual insurance market), we study the impact of
competition on premiums.We exploit variation in ratings-area-level competition induced
by UnitedHealthcare’s decision not to participate in any of the FFMs.We estimate that the
second-lowest-price silver premium (which is directly linked to federal subsidies) would
have decreased by 5.4 percent, on average, had UnitedHealthcare participated. If all insur-
ers active in each state’s individual insurancemarket in 2011 had participated in all ratings
areas in that state’s HIM, we estimate this key premium would be 11.1% lower and 2014
federal subsidies would be reduced by $1.7 billion.
KEYWORDS: health insurance, insurance market competition, health insurance ex-
change, federally facilitated marketplaces
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I. Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in March 2010 and up-
held by the US Supreme Court in June 2012, introduced dramatic reforms to the health
insurance industry. A number of benefit designs were banned, premium variation was
limited, and online marketplaces for the purchase of insurance were established in every
state. Along withMedicaid expansions andmandates for individuals to purchase and large
employers to offer coverage, these marketplaces are a key vehicle for expanding insurance
coverage. Federal health insurance subsidies are only available to those who purchase a
policy through Health Insurance Marketplaces (HIMs), formerly known as exchanges.
HIMs are intended to promote competition along “beneficial” dimensions (such as
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premiums and quality), while at the same time limiting competition along dimensions
thought to be socially undesirable (such as selection based on the health of enrollees).
Whether the federal health reform affordably expands insurance coverage will depend in
no small part on the success of HIMs.
The success of HIMs, in turn, will depend on attracting both consumers and in-
surers. Competition can only have its salutary effects if there are competitors. Prior
to the ACA, health insurance markets were very concentrated. The average state
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for the individual insurance market was 4,100 in
2011, substantially higher than the Department of Justice’s threshold of 2,500 for “highly
concentrated.”1 HIMs were designed to lower barriers to entry into the insurance indus-
try. By steering a pool of subsidy-eligible consumers to HIMs andmandating that individ-
uals carry insurance, policymakers hoped to create enough new demand to allow entrants
to achieve reasonable scale. HIMs also fulfill the role of “certifying” new entrants, whose
plansmust satisfy federal standards in order to participate in these regulatedmarketplaces.
This federal stamp of approval serves to increase both consumer and supplier confidence
in the quality of entrants, a feat that has proved challenging in recent history. And by
displaying products online on a centralized website, HIMs reduce marketing, sales, and
administrative costs. In addition, the ACA provided subsidized loans to new, nonprofit
insurance co-operatives known as Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans, or CO-OPs.
In spite of these policies, there was limited participation in HIMs during 2014, their
first year of operation (and the only year for which data are presently available). In the
discussion that follows, we focus exclusively on the 34 federally facilitated marketplaces
(FFMs), as our identification strategy and data pertain only to this set of marketplaces.
Of the 102 top-three insurers in the 34 FFMs, 55 participated in the relevant state HIM.
A number of large national insurers, such as Aetna, Cigna, and Humana, participated in
only a limited number of HIMs.2 As we discuss in detail below, the nation’s largest insurer,
UnitedHealthcare (hereafter United), did not participate in any of the FFMs. There were
some new entrants, however. Across all FFMs, there were 36 new insurer-state “entries,”
where entry is defined as participation by an insurer that did not offer individual insurance
in that state in 2011.3 Of these 36, 13 were CO-OPs.4
The combination of concentrated pre-HIM markets, substantial nonparticipation in
the HIMs, and limited entry imply highly concentrated marketplaces. Figure 1 gives the
1 Calculated using data from the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO),
described in Section III.
2 Our numbersmay notmatch those reported by theDepartment ofHealth andHuman Services (or other
sources) as we attempted to identify plans offered by the same insurer under different names and link them
to a single insurer.
3 Based on 2011 data, 33 of these 36 had not previously offered individual insurance in any FFM state.
Most “entrants” to the individual market are insurers who previously provided Medicaid-managed care in a
given state.
4 There are 13 new, federally sponsored CO-OPs operating in 13 of the 34 FFMs. In 2014, each CO-OP
operated in only one state, with three exceptions. First, “CO-OPortunity Health” operates in both Iowa
and Nebraska. Second, “Health CO-OPerative SCW” and “Common Ground Healthcare CO-OPerative”
operate in Wisconsin.
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FIGURE 1. Few insurers in many markets
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population-weighted distribution of insurers across the 395 federally delineated ratings
areas in the 34 FFM states. Ratings areas are state-defined regions across which insurers
may vary price and participation.5 Seven percent of the population lives in areas with
only one insurance option, and about half live in areas with three or fewer options. On a
population-weighted basis, there are on average 3.9 insurers per market, with 2.9 incum-
bents (i.e., insurers who are not new to the individual market), 0.3 CO-OP entrants, and
0.7 non-CO-OP entrants.
In this study, we explore the effect of insurer participation in HIMs on 2014 premi-
ums. Prior empirical research finds that insurer consolidation has led to higher premi-
ums for large employer-sponsored plans (Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan 2012) and
fully insured, small-group plans (Guardado, Emmons, and Kane 2013). The degree and
nature of competition, and hence the quantitative relationship between market struc-
ture and premiums, may be different in the HIMs.6 On one hand, HIMs standardize
some plan features and facilitate plan comparisons, creating a more Bertrand-like pricing
5 According to the Department of Health and Human Services, ratings areas “overlap with the issuer
service areas in many, but not all, cases. In general, the number of issuers or plans available in a rating area
will be the number of choices available to all individuals and families living in that rating area. Issuers are
not required to offer a qualified health plan in every rating area within a state, however, so the number of
available issuers and qualified health plans varies by rating area.” (US Department of Health and Human
Services 2013). Thus, ratings areas are natural market definitions for insurance offered through exchanges.
6 There are a number of additional reasons why extrapolating from Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan
(2012) to our scenario is difficult. For example, they study the large-group market, and the initial level of
concentration in these markets during their study period is significantly lower.
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FIGURE 2. More insurers means lower premiums
Notes: Scatter plot reflects 395 ratings areas, with circle sizes corresponding to population. Figure also
contains weighted regression line and and 95 percent shaded confidence interval.
environment. If these design features enable this competitive ideal, markups can be low in
markets with as few as two insurers. On the other hand, the transparent display of non-
standardized plan features (e.g., provider networks) and (eventually) plan qualitymay spur
product differentiation, higher markups, and potentially higher average premiums. In ad-
dition, the existence of subsidies may dampen the price elasticity of some buyers, temper-
ing the relationship between competition and price (and implying more competitors are
needed, ceteris paribus, to generate competitive outcomes).
Our empirical work focuses on the premium for the second-lowest-priced silver plan
within a market. We refer to this premium as 2LPS. Federal subsidies are linked to the
2LPS, and past evidence suggests that the lower tail of the premium distribution may be
particularly important to consumers (Ericson and Starc 2012a). The 2LPS exhibits a sub-
stantial amount of variation nationally: among FFMs, the 90th percentile of 2LPS is 45%
higher than the 10th percentile.
Existing cross-sectional analyses suggest that HIMs with more insurers have lower
premiums.7 Figure 2 illustrates that HIMs with more participants generally have lower
2LPS.The graph shows the distribution of 2LPS by the number ofHIMparticipants, along
with a fitted line from a univariate regression; while there is substantial variation around
the line, the slope is negative (correlation coefficient = −0.35).
This fact admits many interpretations. For example, insurers may prefer to participate
in geographic markets where medical costs are lower. To mitigate such endogeneity con-
cerns, we exploit United’s decision to uniformly avoid all 34 FFMs as a source of quasi-
experimental variation in ex post marketplace concentration. United’s nonparticipation
differentially affected the competitive environment across markets, owing to its pre-ACA
7 See, for example, http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/MarketplacePremiums/ib marketplace
premiums.cfm.
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premium and product characteristics as well as the participation decisions, premiums, and
product characteristics of rivals. It is also a policy-relevant source of variation, as insur-
ers similar to United are likely marginal nonparticipants: if expected profits for insurers
increase, large insurers who shunned the HIMS are likely to enter.
We construct ameasure of the change inmarket concentration resulting fromUnited’s
decision to avoid FFMs.We thenmodel 2LPS across ratings areas as a function of thismea-
sure. We find that premiums are highest in markets where United’s participation would
havemost reduced concentration.Our findings are robust to awide variety of specification
checks.
We estimate that the population-weighted average 2LPS would have been 5.4 percent
lower had United entered all markets in the FFMs. If all insurers present in a state’s indi-
vidual market in 2011 had entered the FFMs, we estimate that the weighted average 2LPS
in the FFMs would have been 11.1 percent lower. We also find that 2LPS is lower in mar-
kets with CO-OPs, although we caution against a causal interpretation of this association
due to the potential endogeneity of CO-OP locations.
These results suggest that additional competitors can have a large impact on premiums
and federal subsidies for HIM plans. Spiro and Gruber (2013) estimate that each 1 percent
reduction in 2LPS reduces federal subsidies by 1.25 percent. Back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lations imply that attracting all incumbents to insurance markets would save an estimated
$1.7 billion in federal subsidies in 2014, and $105.2 billion over the 2014–23 ten-year
horizon, under the (admittedly strong) assumptions that our findings are generalizable
to state-based HIMs and that market structures do not change.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on
the health insurance marketplaces, United’s nonparticipation decision, and prior research
on competition among health insurers. Section III describes the construction of our data
set and discusses summary statistics. Section IV presents themain analysis. SectionV pro-
vides a falsification check of the results by examining the relationship between pre-HIM
individual market premiums and the instrument for HIM HHI. We also discuss robust-
ness of the findings to alternative specifications. Section VI concludes.
II. Background
A. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES
HIMs are regulated online marketplaces for the purchase of health insurance. In this pa-
per, we study HIMs for individual policies.8 The ACA gave states three options with
respect to the development of their HIMs: (1) design and manage their own (so-called
“state-based” marketplaces)—selected by 16 states and DC; (2) let the federal govern-
ment design and operate the marketplace—selected by 27 states; (3) pursue a hybrid ap-
proach (“state–federal partnership”marketplace)—selected by 7 states.Options (2) and (3)
8 HIMs for small-grouppolicies exist—and are knownby the acronymSHOP for the SmallHealthOptions
Program—but as of this writing they do not yet comply with many requirements included in the ACA.
Premium and other data on SHOP plans are not readily available.
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together comprise the federally facilitated marketplaces (FFMs). All HIMs became avail-
able as of October 1, 2013, for individuals to purchase coverage effective in January 2014.
The broad design of an HIM is the same in every state. Five tiers of products are of-
fered. The first tier consists of “catastrophic” high-deductible plans offered primarily to
those under age 30.9 The four remaining tiers are categorized by “actuarial value” (AV),
defined as the share of health-care spending that an insurance plan pays for a typical en-
rollee. These tiers are identified by precious metals (AV thresholds): bronze (0.6); silver
(0.7); gold (0.8); and platinum (0.9). TheACA requires all products sold on or off theHIMs
in the individual and small-group markets to conform to one of these tiers. In addition,
all plans in these markets must satisfy federal standards regarding “essential health ben-
efits.” Essential health benefits include coverage of a specified set of services, restrictions
on benefits limitations (such as annual spending limits), and a maximum out-of-pocket
exposure for enrollees of $6,350 (single)/$12,700 (family).
Subject to this standardization, insurers have wide latitude to design their products in
almost all states. For example, insurers may adjust features of patient out-of-pocket costs
in any way that satisfies the AV standard for a plan’s metal tier. Insurers can offer any plan
design that is within 2 percent of the actuarial-value target, as long as essential benefits are
covered. Insurers may also compete on network design, subject to broad restrictions on
network adequacy. The resulting variation across plans is meaningful. On the pre-ACA
Massachusetts exchange, which standardized benefits to a greater degree than required by
the ACA, themost expensive planwithin a standardized benefits tier (and for a specific zip
code–age combination) was 50 percent more expensive than the cheapest plan (Ericson
and Starc 2013).
Plans on the HIMs set their own premiums. While there is no explicit premium reg-
ulation, there is regulation on the plan Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), the ratio of medical
benefits paid out to premiums collected. MLRs must exceed 80 percent in the individual
and small-group market and 85 percent in the large-group market, which places limits
on the ability of firms to make large profits. In addition, premiums are community-rated,
varying only by ratings area, family composition, tobacco use, and age, with a maximum
3:1 ratio of the premiums for the oldest:youngest enrollee.
All plans on anHIMmust successfully complete theHIM’s “plan certification process.”
The process is uniform across FFMs and is described through public announcements by
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.10 Each plan must be certified as “quali-
fied health plan” (QHP) in the relevant state. QHPs must satisfy a set of standards regard-
ing licensure, service areas, network adequacy, and patient safety. Theymust also undergo
a review of rates. States may review QHP applications and provide recommendations to
CMS regarding certification.
Individuals in the HIMs will in most cases be purchasing insurance products using a
federal tax subsidy. The ACA provides that households with income between 100 percent
9 The catastrophic plan is also available to individuals who do not have the option to purchase insurance
below the mandate affordability threshold of 8 percent of income.
10 For 2015, this notice is available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance
/Downloads/2015-final-issuer-letter-3-14-2014.pdf.
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and 400 percent of the federal poverty line may access tax credits to offset some of their
premiums. These tax credits offset the difference between premiums and a sliding-scale
percentage of income, beginning at 2 percent of income for households with income equal
to 100 percent of the poverty line and rising to 9.5 percent of income between 300 percent
and 400 percent of the poverty line. In some states, a federally fundedMedicaid expansion
covers all those below 133 percent of the poverty line, so HIM participation starts at that
higher level; in states without Medicaid expansions, eligibility for HIM subsidies begins at
100 percent of the poverty line. An estimated 4.8 million individuals have income below
the federal poverty line and are ineligible for subsidies and Medicaid.11
B. UN ITED ’S NONPART IC IPAT ION
A standard difficulty with any study assessing the impact ofmarket concentration on price
is the endogeneity of market participation and market shares. In this setting, one concern
with regressing HIM premiums on market concentration arises from the possibility that
participation decisions (whether by incumbents or de novo entrants) may have been af-
fected by expectations about market premiums. Many of the large national insurers, such
as Aetna, Humana, and Cigna, selectively entered the HIMs. For example, Aetna entered
16 of 34 FFMs.12
One exception is United, the nation’s largest commercial insurer. Once a mid-
size regional insurer, United now has a national footprint, achieved largely through
acquisitions.13 Its market share varies widely across states, with no consistent geographic
pattern. In the individual insurance market, these shares range from less than 1 percent in
Montana, North and South Dakota, New Hampshire, Maine, and Utah to over 20 percent
in South Carolina, Missouri, West Virginia, and Arizona.
The variation in United’s pre-HIM market position implies that its blanket nonpar-
ticipation decision (discussed below) differentially affected the competitive landscape of
each market. United’s decision not to enter could affect 2LPS through two mechanisms:
(1) a “direct effect” arising from the possibility that United could have offered one of the
two lowest-priced silver plans in a given market; and/or (2) an “indirect effect” due to
rivals’ strategically lowering their premiums to compete with United. We expect both ef-
fects to be larger in areas where United would have been a more significant competitor
on the HIMs. In areas where United had higher pre-HIM market share in the individual
insurance market, we can infer that its combination of premium and product attributes
was relatively attractive. Thus, its decision to stay out of the market ought to have softened
competition more considerably in these markets (the indirect effect). If United’s premium
11 Source: “The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid,”
Kaiser Family Foundation Issue Brief, March 2014. http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com
/2014/04/8505-the-coverage-gap uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid.pdf.
12 These entry decisions are nonrandom. For example, Aetna’s pre-exchange individual market share (per
2011 CCIIO data, described below) was more than twice as high in the markets it entered as compared to
those it did not. Note that Aetna participates on seven exchanges using the Aetna brand name. Inmost other
exchanges, it offers plans under the brand name of Coventry, which it acquired in 2013.
13 Major plan acquisitions in the past decade include Oxford andMid Atlantic Medical Services (MAMSI)
in 2004, PacifiCare in 2005, Sierra in 2008, and parts of HealthNet in 2009.
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tended to be on the low side in these markets as well, all else equal we would also expect
the direct effect to be larger in these areas. Our data on pre-HIM individual market pre-
miums (described in Section III below) confirm that United’s relative rates are lower in
states in which they have a larger presence.14
Note that if United’s decision not to participate in amarket provoked otherswhowould
not otherwise have participated to do so—and if this is particularly likely where United
had high pre-HIM share because the market opportunity is more substantial—then our
estimated effects will be downward-biased. Given the long application process associated
with participating in the first-generation FFMs, we believe this bias is likely to be small.
For the same reason, the indirect effect may also be low in the first year of the HIM oper-
ations, as rivals may not have had ample time to adjust their premiums in light of United’s
nonparticipation decision.
Figure 3 depicts a timeline for insurers’ applications and submissions to HIMs, along
with pertinent public statements United made about their participation plans. Per the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), insurers had to submit their plan
designs by the end of March 2013 and premiums by May 3.15 However, there was likely
some flexibility to adjust premiums after that deadline, as Kathleen Sebelius, secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services (which oversees CMS), stated in late June
that rates were not yet finalized.16
The first public proclamation of limited participation by United appeared in January
2013, when the Wall Street Journal reported that United was “expected to participate
in 10 to 25 . . . marketplaces . . . out of . . . 100.”17 As this total incorporates the small-
businessHIMs (SHOPs), the implication is thatUnitedwas expected to participate in 5–13
individual HIMs (out of the 51 HIMs, one in each state as well as Washington, DC). The
article further quotes United’s CEO as stating, “[United’s] level of interest in exchanges
will be driven by how we assess each local market—how the exchange and rules are set up
state by state.” This statement foreshadows United’s blanket decision to stay out of all the
FFMs,which had uniform regulations. It is therefore possible that some insurers accurately
predicted United’s nonparticipation in at least some states at this time.
On April 18, 2013, a couple of weeks before HHS’s May 3 Initial Qualified Health Plan
Submission Deadline, United’s CEO reiterated: “We will be very selective. . . . [We] do not
believe exchanges will be a significant factor . . . in our 2014 commercial market outlook.”
Given this statement occurred after the “participation deadline” of March 31 and before
premiums were finalized, this later announcement could have influenced pricing (the in-
direct effect). Note, however, that even if rivals did not attempt to predict and incorporate
14 Specifically, United’s relative price position (as measured by where its premium per member falls in the
within-state premium distribution) was lower in states where it had greater pre-exchange share.
15 http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/marketplace-timeline-narra
tive.pdf.
16 Sebelius asserted, “Wewill be negotiating rates across the country.”WhileHHS lacks the authority to “ac-
tively negotiate” with plans (i.e., exclude plans if their rates are too high), HHS may have had other levers to
negotiate with insurers, and insurers would likely have been free to revise premiums downward at this point.
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/sebelius-administration-is-negotiating-rates-in-federal-exchanges/.
17 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324468104578247332079234240.
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FIGURE 3. Could United have affected rivals’ pricing?
Notes: 1http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324468104578247332079234240.
2http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/cms-extends-qhp-application-deadline/.
3http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/04/18/unitedhealth-to-be-very-selective-exchange-user.
4http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/marketplace-timeline
-narrative.pdf.
5http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/unitedhealth-spurs-obama-exchanges-as-rules
-stall-profit.html.
6Sebelius asserted, “Wewill be negotiating rates across the country.”WhileHHS lacks the authority to
“actively negotiate” with plans (i.e., exclude plans if their rates are too high), HHSmay have had other
levers to negotiate with insurers, and insurers would likely have been free to revise premiums down-
ward at this point http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/sebelius-administration-is-negotiating-rates-in
-federal-exchanges/.
United’s decisions into their pricing decisions, the direct effect would still operate as a
mechanism to lower premiums.
C. PR IOR RESEARCH
c.. insurance market competition. This study builds on existing re-
search on competition among private insurers. A number of recent studies show that im-
perfect competition in various US health insurance markets leads to higher premiums.
These include Starc (2014) for theMedigapmarket, Ericson and Starc (2012b) for theMas-
sachusetts health insurance exchange, Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) for the
large employer market, and Guardado, Emmons, and Kane (2013) for the fully insured,
small-employer market. Starc predicts that entry of a single additional large insurer would
reduce the enrollment-weighted Medigap premium by 21 percent and expand the mar-
ket by 50 percent. Ericson and Starc build a model of consumer demand using enrollment
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data from theMassachusetts health insurance exchange and simulate optimal insurer pric-
ing under alternative competitive scenarios. They find that pricing exceeds the levels pre-
dicted under perfect competition. Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) quantify
the impact of market concentration (as measured by HHI) on premium growth in the
large-group segment, instrumenting for concentration using the predicted change in local
market HHI generated by a large, national merger in 1999. This merger had varying im-
pacts on local markets owing to differences in the market shares and geographic overlap
of the merging firms. They estimate premiums in the average market were approximately
7 percentage points higher by 2007 due to increases in local concentration between 1998
and 2006. Finally, Guardado, Emmons, and Kane (2013) use data on small-group pre-
miums at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) carrier level to study the impact of a
2008merger betweenNevada’s first and third-largest insurance carriers, United and Sierra
Health Services. As compared to plans in control MSAs (matched to the treatment MSAs
using propensity scores), metropolitan areas affected by themerger experienced premium
increases of 13.7 percent.
Our instrument is similar in spirit to that used byDafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan
(2012).We exploit variation in the local impact of United’s national nonparticipation deci-
sion to identify the effect of exchangemarket concentration on premiums.WhereasDafny,
Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) study the effect of HHI on premium growth, we have
only one year of data and hence focus on premium levels. Our point estimates are roughly
one-third the size of those reported by Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012). Be-
cause their estimate captures the cumulative impact of changes in HHI over time, it is
unsurprising that we find a smaller single-year effect.
c.. exchange research. As HIMs are a recent phenomenon, there is a limited
amount of relevant prior research.We briefly discuss the literature on the threemost direct
predecessors to HIMs: theMassachussetts Connector exchange,Medicare Advantage, and
Medicare Part D.
There are a number of recent papers examining the Massachusetts Health Connec-
tor, an exchange established by the 2006 health-care reforms in Massachusetts. In a series
of papers, Ericson and Starc study (1) how changes in the degree of plan standardization
required by the exchange affected consumer choice, plans offered, and pricing (Ericson
and Starc 2013), (2) what types of plans consumers choose (20 percent select the cheapest
option; Ericson and Starc 2012a), and (3) the interaction between age-specific consumer
price elasticities, imperfect competition, and modified community rating (Ericson and
Starc 2012b). Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2013) report that average costs and pre-
miums per insured individual in Massachusetts decreased following the imposition of the
mandate to carry insurance coverage, confirming adverse selection into the state’s indi-
vidual insurance market prior to 2006.
Another predecessor of HIMs is the market for privately provided Medicare plans,
known today as “Medicare Advantage.” Like HIMs, competition among plans can af-
fect prices and subsidies. Unlike HIMs, market participants compete against traditional
Medicare, and often use the same provider reimbursement rates as traditional Medicare.
Medicare Advantage premiums (after subsidies, which all Medicare eligible enjoy) can-
not fall below zero. In addition, profit margins are restricted. Thus, plans may provide
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beneficiaries with additional benefits beyond those offered in traditional Medicare. Of
greatest relevance to our work, a growing body of evidence suggests that Medicare Ad-
vantagemarkets are imperfectly competitive, with a large share of increases in government
subsidies accruing to providers, rather than being competed away throughmore generous
enrollee benefits. (See, for example, Song, Landrum, and Chernew 2012; Song, Landrum,
and Chernew 2013; Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney 2013; and Duggan, Starc, and Vabson
2014.)
There is a substantial and growing body of literature onMedicare PartD, amarketplace
withmany similarities to theHIMs. In both settings, the government subsidizes purchases
and creates rules to manage how competition among firms takes place. This literature
focuses heavily on whether enrollees make good choices, how limitations in consumer
decision-making affect firm behavior, and how alternative choice architecture could im-
prove consumer welfare. (See, for example, Abaluck andGruber 2011, 2013; Ericson 2014;
Ketcham et al. 2012; Kling et al. 2012; Lucarelli, Prince, and Simon 2012; Zhou and Zhang
2012; andHeiss et al. 2012.) Overall, theMedicare Part D literature suggests that even with
robust entry, poor optimization by enrollees mitigates the salutary effects of competition.
III. Data and Methodology
We draw on a number of sources to create a data set of plans offered in the 395 ratings
areas (across 34 FFMs), along withmeasures of ratings-area-level market structure and lo-
cal health spending. Because United’s nonparticipation decision was uniform only across
FFMs, we limit attention to these.We also construct a data set of enrollment and premiums
at various units of geography, depending on the source.
A. KEY DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VAR IABLES
Data on plans were downloaded from the healthcare.gov website.18 The plan data con-
tains insurer identifiers, plan metal tier, ratings areas in which a plan is offered, and
premiums for a 27-year-old. Our key dependent variable, 2LPS, is the premium for the
second-lowest-price silver plan in a ratings area. Plan premiums for other ages and family
structures are a constant percentage of the 27-year-old single premium.19
We focus on the 2LPS for two reasons. First, federal subsidies are linked to the 2LPS
in each “ratings area,” the geographic market utilized on the HIMs.More specifically, sub-
sidies are set so that 2LPSminus the subsidy is nomore than x percent of income, where x
ranges between 2 and 9.5 and increases with income as described in Section II. Those with
household incomes above 400 percent of the federal poverty line are not eligible for subsi-
dies. Recently released enrollment data from the FFMs shows that 85 percent of enrollees
in 2014 received government subsidies.20 The Congressional Budget Office projects that
76 percent of HIM enrollees in 2020 will receive subsidies, accounting for $93 billion of
18 Source: https://www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-information.
19 States had the opportunity to design their own state-specific age curves for defining how premiums
would vary by age. None in our sample did so.
20 http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2014/MarketPlaceEnrollment/Apr2014/excel/workbook.xls.
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the $197 billion estimated cost of ACA’s coverage expansions.21 Thus, 2LPS is a key driver
of the overall costs of the ACA.
Second, there is evidence that the lower segment of the premium distribution is par-
ticularly important to consumers. As noted above, Ericson and Starc (2012a) report that
a substantial number of consumers who purchased insurance on the Massachusetts ex-
change in 2007–09 selected the least expensive plan. In 2014, 65 percent of FFM enrollees
chose a silver plan, and 20 percent chose bronze plans.22 More pragmatically, given the
number of plans, and our inability to judge which of these will prove relevant in each
marketplace, a measure like the mean or median is less informative. For completeness,
however, we also report results using such measures.
Our key independent variable for measuring competition is HH I , a predicted
Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Because the market is new, we must predict market shares
in order to compute a predicted HHI. To do so, we match insurers appearing in the FFM
data with state-insurer enrollment data (in the individual insurance market) for 2011.
These data are collected and reported by the Center for Consumer Information and In-
surance Oversight (CCIIO) for the purpose of enforcing the MLR regulations.
For insurer i in ratings area m, we define shar eim as its share among those insurers
who are active within that ratings area in the exchange, under the assumption that insur-
ers split the market proportionally to their ex ante (i.e., 2011) state shares. Based on the
limited empirical evidence available, it appears that pre-exchange shares are highly corre-
lated with exchange shares.23 This methodology gives new entrants a share of zero. (In
Section V.B., we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative share allocations
for entrants.) Denoting the set of insurers in market m as Im, we construct HH Im =∑
i∈Im shar eim.
Next, we construct HHI, the change in HHI resulting from United’s nonpartici-
pation. The predicted share of each insurer had United entered the market is denoted
shar eUim, and the predicted HHI is HH IUm . United’s share had it entered the FFMs is
shar eUUHCm. Note that for all insurers other than United, shar eim = shar e
U
im
1−shar eUUHCm
.The in-
crease in HHI from United’s nonparticipation can then be expressed as
HHIm = HH Im − HH IUm (1);
HHIm =
∑
i∈Im
(
shar eUim
1 − shar eUUHCm
)2
−
(∑
i∈Im
(
shar eUim
)2 + (shar eUUHCm)2
)
(2).
21 http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45231-ACA Estimates.pdf.
22 Ibid. 15 percent chose catastrophic, gold, or platinum plans.
23 Emerging evidence on exchange enrollment suggests that pre-exchange shares are good indicators of
exchange shares. TheHuffington Post collected enrollment data for eight states (CA, CT,MA,MN, NV, NY,
RI,WA). Using their reported data (which excludes some small players) for states other thanMA (which had
an exchange prior to 2011), we calculated predicted exchange market shares using 2011 CCIIO data (and
excluding United). Insurers that entered in 2014 but were not present in 2011 are assigned a share of 0 in
2011. Insurers present in 2011 but not participating in the exchanges are excluded. The correlation between
our predicted shares and the actual 2014 shares was 0.63. (Data source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2014/01/27/health-insurance-obamacare n 4661164.html.)
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The effect of increasing United’s share on HHIm is
∂HHIm
∂shar eUUHCm
= 2[HH Im − shar eUUHCmHH Im − shar eUUHCm] (3).
This expression shows that, theoretically, United’s nonparticipation has a nonmonotonic
effect on HHI. If United is very large and its competitors are all small, HHI will de-
crease in shar eUUHCm and can even become negative. As a practical matter, HHI in our
data is almost always increasing inUnited’s share, and is only negative for one observation.
We censor this observation at zero in our main results; dropping it has little impact on the
findings.
An alternative toHHI is United’s pre-exchange share. The advantage of usingHHI is
that it captures the relative importance of United’s rivals: a 10 percent United sharematters
more in a market with just one rival (HHI = 1, 800) than in a market with, say, three
equally sized rivals (eachwith pre-exchangemarket share of 30 percent, yieldingHHI =
533). As a robustness check, however, we also examine results usingUnited’s pre-exchange
share in place of HHI.
B. ADD IT IONAL CONTROLS
We supplement our data set with a number of controls that may affect health-care costs,
insurance preferences, or the competitive environment in a ratings area. The first of these
measures is hospital price, constructed using 2007–09 hospital-level data from the Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ Healthcare Cost Report Information System
(HCRIS) data set.24 Hospitals account for roughly one-third of spending by private in-
surance plans, hence hospital prices are a significant determinant of premiums.We follow
the methodology in Dafny (2009), which calculates price as the net inpatient revenue per
case-mix adjusted, non-Medicare admission.25 Although it would be preferable to exclude
Medicaid admissions from this price measure, as hospitals are paid largely fixed rates for
these patients, the HCRIS data on Medicaid revenues are exceedingly noisy.
Per Dafny and Ramanarayanan (2012), nonprofits with significant market share
charge lower premiums, ceteris paribus, than for-profits. We control for this by including
the expected market share of nonprofit insurers, share NFP, using the samemethodology
to assign shares that we used to calculate HHI. We account separately for the presence
of a nonprofit CO-OP using a dummy variable (which varies at the ratings-area level).26
Both share NFP and CO-OP are likely to be endogenous. However, the similarity of the
24 Cost Report estimates for hospital prices shift from year to year. For example, the non-Medicare
admission-weighted correlation in prices for facilities in 2007 and 2009 is 0.73. We therefore pool three
years (deflating to a common year using the CPI) to improve the precision of our estimates.
25 We use each hospital’s Medicare Case-Mix Index (CMI) to adjust for admissions severity; non-Medicare
CMI is not reported. Critical Access Hospitals and other hospitals not paid under Medicare’s Prospective
Payment System are excluded from the sample.
26 Our methodology assigns zero share to entrants, hence the need for a separate variable. In addition,
nonprofit CO-OPs are of independent interest as they are new entrants partially funded by government
loans.
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results with and without controls tempers concerns that their inclusion biases the effect of
interest (i.e., how competition affects price).
Last, we include a parsimonious set of demographic controls in our main specifica-
tion: per capita income for 2011 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and percent
black and percent Hispanic from Census data. Although we considered many other de-
mographic controls (such as percent diabetic and percent uninsured) and market-level
controls (such as area hospital market concentration), and (as discussed in Section V.B.
below) the key results are robust to inclusion of these controls, we did not retain them
in our preferred specification for two reasons. First, the coefficient estimates display clas-
sic signs of multicollinearity, and second, multiple demographic controls absorb degrees
of freedom that are particularly scarce in our falsification tests, which rely on state and
MSA-level data.
Notably, we present estimates excluding all controls to illustrate their impact on the
results. All regressions are weighted using the 2011 ratings-area population estimates as
weights.27
C. ADDRESS ING L IM ITAT IONS OF THE INSTRUMENTAL
VAR IABLES APPROACH
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, our instrument must be correlated with predicted ex-
change HHI, but uncorrelated with other determinants of premiums.28 There are two
primary mechanisms by which this assumption could be violated. First, United’s market
share may itself capture underlying market conditions in a way that is reflected in premi-
ums. For example, United may be able to compete more effectively in high-cost insurance
markets where its ability to negotiate tough deals with providers can be most valuable. To
address this concern, we use pre-HIM data to show that there is no preexisting correlation
between the instrument and insurance premiums.
Ideally, we would like to have a measure of pre-exchange premiums for individual
policies at the ratings-area level. Unfortunately, these data do not exist. Therefore, we
consider four distinct alternatives, each with strengths and limitations. We construct two
measures of premiums from the 2011Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Com-
ponent (MEPS-IC). The first is the average estimated single enrollee (as opposed to fam-
ily) premium for private-sector establishments.29 The MEPS-IC publishes these data for
27 The coefficients of interest are smaller, but remain statistically significant in unweighted models.
28 A sufficient condition for United’s nonentry to be an exogenous decision is for it to have been driven by
United having a particularly high fixed cost to entering any FFMs. If, by contrast, United’s nonparticipation
was driven by price shocks that were unobserved to the econometrician, then the fact that United chose not
to enter but that Aetna, Cigna, and Humana did enter in some markets should lead us to update our priors
about prices in markets in which United had been dominant. Note that this source of endogeneity biases
our estimates downward; that is, if United shunned all of the FFMs because of negative profit shocks to the
markets in which it was likely to be dominant, then we would expect lower prices in markets that had been
United heavy. To test for this possibility, we confirmed that our results are robust to excluding the states
in which United had the most enrollees (i.e., larger states in which United had had a presence, like Texas,
Florida, and Michigan).
29 The MEPS reports raw premiums without any case-mix adjustment.
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large MSAs and state “residuals” (i.e., non-MSA areas). Therefore, the strength of this
measure is that it is available at a relatively fine level of geography; our 34 states contain
79 MEPS-IC markets.30 However, employer premiums are imperfectly correlated with
individual-market premiums—in spite of the fact that both reflect local market cost and
utilization trends—limiting the value of evidence that employer premiums are uncorre-
lated with HHI (the falsification exercise).31 Hence, we also present results using the
average estimated single enrollee premium for small employers only, which ismore closely
linked to the individual market.32 The limitation of this second measure is that it is only
available at the state level, owing to MEPS-IC confidentiality restrictions.
Our third measure of pre-exchange premiums is the average 2011 individual mar-
ket premium by state, as reported by CCIIO. (This source is also used to calculate our
pre-exchange market shares, as described above.) This average premium is available for
the most relevant market segment (the individual market), but only at the state level. The
fourth and final measure of premiums comes from the Large Employer Health Insurance
Dataset (LEHID) for 2009, the most recent year for which we have these data. LEHID is
a proprietary data set containing information on the health insurance plans (and asso-
ciated premiums) offered by a sample of very large employers. The details of these data,
as well as their comparability with other sources, are discussed in Dafny (2010). LEHID’s
main strengths are that it is available at a relatively disaggregated level of geography (our
34 states contain 98 LEHID markets),33 and that it includes a rich set of variables we can
use to control for plan and employee characteristics. However, the data are older and re-
flect an even more distant market segment from the individual market than the MEPS-IC
all-employer sample.34
A second concern with our identifying assumption is that variation in HHI comes
not only from variation across states in United’s individual insurance market share, but
also from the decisions of other insurers to participate on the HIMs in each ratings area.
This arises from the fact that United’s predicted share for each ratings area is defined as
30 MSAs and ratings areas do not perfectly match.We assign each ratings area to theMSAwith the highest
share of the ratings area’s population. We follow the same procedure for assigning ratings areas to LEHID
markets.
31 Most employer-sponsored plans are self-insured, whereas all individual plans are fully insured. Self- and
fully insured plans are subject to different regulations and premium taxes, andmarket participantsmay differ
across the two segments. For more details, see Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012). The correlation
between state-level employer premiums and small-employer premiums in the MEPS is 0.61.
32 Most small-group plans are fully insured, and therefore subject to the same regulations as individual
policies. In addition, state-level regulations regarding community rating (when present) are often the same
for individuals and small groups.
33 There are 139 geographic markets defined by LEHID.Most reflect metropolitan areas or nonmetropoli-
tan areas within the same state (e.g., Chicago, Northern Illinois except Chicago, Southern Illinois), although
a few cross state boundaries.
34 To improve the precision of our estimates for HHI, we pool LEHID data from 2007–09 and include
both self- and fully insured enrollees when constructing insurer shares. When constructing LEHID premi-
ums, we use only 2009 and only fully insured enrollees, as the fully insured segment is more similar to the
individual market than the self-insured segment. The falsification results are not sensitive to this decision.
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the ratio of its state-level share to the sum of state-level shares of all insurers participating
on the exchange in that ratings area. The advantage of definingHHI in this way (rather
than using all insurers’ pre-exchange state-level shares) is that it provides a more accurate
estimate of United’s likely market share in a ratings area. Some insurers are not active in
all areas of a state, and this is likely a principal driver of their decision not to participate
on the HIMs in these areas. The disadvantage is that participation may also depend on
unobserved factors correlated with exchange premiums. For example, more insurers may
wish to participate in areas where HIMs are likely to attract healthy enrollees, generating
a spurious negative correlation between premiums and concentration. To the extent that
these confounding factors vary at the state level, state fixed effects will address this con-
cern. In Section V.B., we confirm that the reduced-form coefficient of interest is indeed
robust to inclusion of state fixed effects.35
We also construct a measure of HHI that mitigates concerns about the endogene-
ity of within-state insurer participation decisions; this is accomplished by constructing
insurer shares using purely ex ante data (i.e., not conditioning upon which incumbent
individual market insurers actually offered plans in a given market). We cannot rely on
the CCIIO state-level data, as doing so would result in only 34 unique values for HHI
(and correspondingly noisy estimates). The MEPS-IC cannot be readily used to calcu-
late insurer market shares, as there is no data field identifying the insurance carrier for
each plan. Hence, we utilize the LEHID data (which, as previously noted, reflect the large-
group market) and data from InterStudy, a proprietary source of insurer enrollment data
by MSA.36 For both sources, we limit the data to fully insured private insurance plans.37
The LEHID data yield 98 unique market observations, and the InterStudy data contain 79
MSAs.
D. SUMMARY STAT IST ICS
Table 1 presents population-weighted summary statistics for the 395 ratings areas (“ex-
change markets”) in FFM states. Exchange markets are highly concentrated: the average
number of insurers per market is only 3.9. Predicted HHIs are correspondingly very high,
with an average of 7,323, much greater than the DOJ/FTC threshold of 2,500 for “very
concentrated.” We caution that these HHIs are overstated because our methodology does
not allocate share to entrants (who do not appear in the CCIIO data). Nearly 30 percent
of people live in markets with one to two insurers, and half live in markets with three
35 Our preferred specifications do not include state fixed effects, however, as these absorb a significant
amount of the variation in HHI.
36 We attempted to create additional observations for “state residuals.” However, most states have MSAs
that cross state boundaries, making it impossible to infer market shares for state residuals. Adding in the
state residuals for which this is not a problem does not substantively change the results.
37 The InterStudy data also contain enrollment for self-insured plans and commercialMedicaid.We exam-
ined whether the results are robust to (1) including the self-insured lives, and (2) including Medicaid lives
and adding a separate control for Medicaid’s share of covered lives. In both cases, the main results remain
qualitatively similar, but the coefficient on HHI ceases to be significant at conventional levels.
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FIGURE 4. Predicted impact of United’s decision
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or fewer insurers.38 Despite the relatively small number of insurers, most ratings areas
feature a large number of plans: the mean is 50.9 (including all metal tiers), and 17.2 for
silver plans only. The predicted share of nonprofit insurers averages 61 percent. One in
three markets contains a CO-OP.
Figure 4 is a histogram depicting the number of ratings areas with different ranges of
HHI. The figure reveals that the predicted impact of United on market concentration
is large and varies significantly across markets. The population-weighted mean of HHI
is 1,644, which is similar in magnitude to the change in HHI that would result from a
transition from three to two evenly sized firms.
Figure 5 presents information on the identities of the firms that offer one of the two
lowest silver premiums in exchangemarkets. The Blues offer the plurality of low-premium
exchange plans (57 percent), which is unsurprising given their high market shares in
pre-exchange individual insurance, low premiums, and near-universal participation in
HIMs.39 As a first hint that CO-OPs are associated with lower 2LPS, we find they are
often represented in the bottom two. Significantly, for-profit incumbents (i.e., firms like
United) offered 20 percent of these low-priced plans.
38 Because more populous markets tend to have more competitors, the average market is less competitive
than the population-weighted numbers suggest. The unweighted average number of insurers and HHI are
2.8 and 8,320, respectively.
39 Dafny and Ramanarayanan (2012) find evidence suggesting the largest nonprofit Blues have lower pre-
miums than comparably sized for-profit Blues.
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FIGURE 5. Identity of 1st and 2nd lowest-priced silver insurers, by category
Note: N = 790.
IV. The Relationship between Market Structure and Prices
A. ARE PR ICES CORRELATED WITH MARKET STRUCTURE?
We begin by examining whether 2L P S is correlated with our endogenous measure of
competition. More specifically, we estimate the following equation using data at the
ratings-area level:
ln(2L P S)m = βHH Im[+Xmλ] + εm (4).
HH Im is our estimate of market competition and Xm is a vector of optional controls,
specifically ln(hospital price), ln(per capita income), share NFP, CO-OP, percent
black, and percent Hispanic. All observations are weighted by the 2011 ratings-area pop-
ulation. Results from this endogenous regression are presented in the first two columns
of Table 2. The first column excludes the control variables, while the second column in-
cludes them. In both specifications, greater concentration is positively and significantly
correlated with 2LPS. The results imply a one-standard-deviation decrease in HHI (equal
to 0.2, per Table 1, which is slightly larger than the mean decrease in HHI that would re-
sult if United entered all ratings areas) is associated with a reduction in 2LPS of 5.6–7.2
percent. Of course, given the endogeneity concerns raised above, we are hesitant to place
a causal interpretation on the findings.
B. DOES COMPET I T ION HAVE A CAUSAL EFFECT ON PREMIUMS?
Next, we investigate whether competition has a causal effect on premiums. We posit that
United’s decision not to participate in any of the FFMs is a source of plausibly exogenous
variation in exchange market structure. We use HHIm, as defined in Section III.A., to
instrument for HH Im. In the following three subsections, we (1) confirm that HHIm is
correlated with HH Im; (2) show that HHIm is correlated with 2LPS; and (3) estimate
equation 4 using HHIm as an instrument for HH Im.
b.. first-stage model. To evaluate whether HHIm is indeed predictive of
changes in HH Im, we estimate the following model:
HH Im = βHHIm[+Xmλ] + εm (5).
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TABLE 2. Main results
Endogenous First Reduced Instrumental
regression stage form variables
Dep var = Dep var = Dep var = Dep var =
ln(2LPS) HHI ln(2LPS) ln(2LPS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HHI 0.274a 0.348a 0.260a 0.336a
(0.040) (0.041) (0.079) (0.083)
HHI 0.954a 0.871a 0.248a 0.293a
(0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
ln(per capita income) 0.058 −0.138a 0.009 0.055
(0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
ln(hospital price) 0.183a −0.011 0.179a 0.183a
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038)
CO-OP in market −0.086a 0.022 −0.078a −0.085a
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Share nonprofit −0.077a 0.157a −0.023 −0.075a
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Percent black 0.156b 0.241a 0.240a 0.159b
(0.064) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066)
Percent Hispanic −0.087c −0.281a −0.186a −0.091
(0.052) (0.055) (0.054) (0.056)
R2 0.105 0.290 0.259 0.398 0.025 0.185 0.105 0.289
Notes: N = 395. All regressions are weighted by the ratings-area population under 65, as reported
by the US Census. The instrument for HHI is HHI. Standard errors in parentheses. ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10.
Results are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 2, first excluding and then
including the controls described above. Across both specifications, changes in HHIm
translate into HH Im nearly one for one, and the coefficient estimates are highly statisti-
cally significant. A number of the controls, such as income, racial composition, and share
NFP, are significant predictors of HHI.
b.. reduced form. The reduced-form model relates exchange premiums to the
instrument, that is,
ln(2L P Sm) = βHHIm[+Xmλ] + εm (6).
The results, presented in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2, imply that premiums are
higher in markets where United’s nonparticipation has a larger effect on predicted mar-
ket competition. For example, in a market with the median weighted HHIm, we predict
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2LPS would have been 3.6 percent lower.40 The remaining variables enter with the ex-
pected signs. We discuss them further in the following section.
b.. instrumental variables. Finally, we estimate the IV regression
ln(2L P Sm) = βHH Im[+Xmλ] + εm (7),
instrumenting for HH Im withHHIm. The results, presented in the final two columns of
Table 2, suggest ameaningful impact ofUnited’s nonparticipation on premiums. Given the
first-stage coefficient estimates are close to 1, the coefficients are very similar inmagnitude
to the reduced-form estimates in the adjacent columns. The results are also fairly similar
to theOLS results from the first two columns, potentiallymitigating endogeneity concerns
with the OLS results.
To gauge themagnitude of the results, we examine howpremiumswould change under
two scenarios: (1) United enters all FFM ratings areas; and (2) all incumbent insurers enter
all FFM ratings areas in the states in which they offered individual insurance in 2011.
Using the coefficient in column 8 (the specification with controls) as our central estimate,
we calculate that population-weighted 2LPS would have been 5.4 percent lower under
scenario (1) and 11.1 percent lower under scenario (2). We caution that the latter estimate
requires making projections far out of sample, where the assumption of a linear effect of
changes in HHI is less likely to be valid.
The estimate for the effect of CO-OP on premiums is of independent policy interest.
2LPS is 8.1 percent lower in markets with CO-OPs; however, as we discuss in Section
V.B. below, CO-OP location may be endogenous. The coefficients on the remaining con-
trols enter with plausible signs and magnitudes. A 1 percent increase in inpatient hospital
prices is associated with a ∼0.2 percent increase in insurance premiums. This is the same
proportion of private health-care expenditures attributable to inpatient care for privately
insured, nonelderly patients.41
Our reduced-form estimates combine the “direct” and “indirect” effects previously de-
scribed. To gauge the plausibility of our combined estimate and to attempt to disentangle
the two, we performed two different exercises. As a first exercise, we simulated the effects
of adding a randomly selected participant (from the set of all participants, in all ratings
areas) as an “entrant” into each ratings area. We normalized the entrant’s premiums to ac-
count for differences in themean and variance of premiums across states, and we repeated
the exercise 1,000 times to obtain average effects and standard errors. Details are provided
in the Online Appendix (www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/Suppl/10.1162/ajhe a 00003).
The results suggest that adding a randomly selected entrant to all markets reduces the
weighted-average 2LPS by 4.5 percent, on average. As a second exercise, we removed
each of the three largest FFM participants from the data and recalculated 2LPS. Ar-
guably, these insurers are the closest analogs to United. The resulting increases in 2LPS
40 Using the estimate of 0.293 from column 6 (the specification with controls), together with the median
weighted HHIm of 0.12, yields exp(0.293 × 0.12) = 1.036.
41 Figure is from Health Care Cost Institute (2013).
73
AM E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F H E A L T H E C O N OM I C S
averaged 4.5 percent.42 Overall, these results suggest that the magnitudes we obtain are
sensible, and that the premium increases we estimate could be driven entirely by the direct
effect.
V. Robustness
A. FALS IF ICAT ION EXERC ISE
As noted earlier, there are potential concerns about the endogeneity of our instrument. In
this section, we present a series of falsification tests designed to examine those concerns.
Our first test documents thatHHI is uncorrelated with preperiod premiums, which
should allay concerns that the share of themarket held byUnited is correlatedwith omitted
determinants of exchange premiums. Preperiod premium data do not exist at the ratings-
area level. We therefore use several sources of premium data, some available at the state
level, some at roughly the MSA (and MSA residual) level, and one at the LEHID market
level. Given the higher level of aggregation (relative to the ratings area), our statistical
tests will have lower power, making it harder to reject the null of no correlation between
HHI and preperiod premiums. Hence, we compare the results from these regressions
with those obtained from estimating our primary reduced-form regression (equation 6)
using the same geographical market definitions. Table 3 presents these results. To increase
the comparability of estimates across different dependent and independent variables, we
standardize both the dependent and independent variables (by subtracting the mean and
dividing by the standard deviation). All specifications are weighted and include the set of
controls from prior models.
Column 1 presents results using MEPS MSA-level data on premiums for employer-
sponsored plans. Specification 1 (i.e., the top specification) examines whether our
reduced-form relationship between 2L P S andHHI from column 6 of Table 2 is present
when the data are aggregated to the MSA level. The point estimate is smaller than our es-
timate from the ratings-area data (i.e., 0.194 vs. 0.336), and statistically significant at p <
0.10. In contrast, specification 2 (i.e., the bottom specification) contains no evidence of
a statistically significant relationship between MEPS employer premiums in the prepe-
riod and HHI. The point estimate is near zero, albeit with large standard errors. The
difference between the coefficient estimates in specifications 1 and 2 is not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Columns 2 and 3 repeat the same analysis using state-level preperiod premiumdata; as
discussed above, both theMEPS small-employer premium data and the CCIIO individual
insurance data are only available at the state level. Given the high level of aggregation, it
is unsurprising that the coefficients from specification 1 (while very similar in magnitude
42 Removing Aetna (which participated primarily through its Coventry brand, which offers Medicaid
HMOs) from the calculation of 2LPS results in a weighted-average increase in 2LPS (across the markets
in which it participated) of 2.5 percent. Removing Humana or Wellpoint (separately) increases weighted-
average 2LPS by 5.9 and 5.2 percent, respectively. A simple average across these estimates is 4.5 percent.
We caution that the specific market participation decisions of these insurers appear to be endogenous (see
footnote 13), hence this exercise is largely descriptive.
74
More Insurers Lower Premiums // dafny, gruber, ody
T
A
B
L
E
3
.
R
ed
uc
ed
-f
or
m
fa
ls
iﬁ
ca
tio
n
ex
er
ci
se
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
So
ur
ce
of
pr
e-
pe
ri
od
pr
em
iu
m
s
M
EP
S,
al
lﬁ
rm
s
M
EP
S,
sm
al
lﬁ
rm
s
CC
IIO
LE
H
ID
LE
H
ID
N
/A
So
ur
ce
of

H
H
I
CC
IIO
CC
IIO
CC
IIO
CC
IIO
LE
H
ID
In
te
rS
tu
dy
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
1
(c
on
fir
m
at
io
n
th
at
m
ai
n
re
su
lts
pe
rs
is
t)
:
D
ep
Va
r=
ln
(2
LP
S)
,s
tu
de
nt
iz
ed

H
H
I(
st
ud
en
tiz
ed
)
0.
19
4c
0.
17
4
0.
17
4
0.
18
8c
0.
17
9
0.
14
9c
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
80
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
70
)
(0
.0
89
)
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
2
(f
al
si
fic
at
io
n)
:
D
ep
Va
r=
ln
(p
re
-p
er
io
d
pr
em
iu
m
s)
,s
tu
de
nt
iz
ed

H
H
I(
st
ud
en
tiz
ed
)
0.
02
9
0.
01
1
0.
03
9
0.
01
8
−0
.0
33
(0
.1
13
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.0
61
)
(0
.1
04
)
N
um
be
ro
fo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
79
34
34
98
98
24
8
U
ni
to
fo
bs
er
va
tio
n
M
SA
St
at
e
St
at
e
LE
H
ID
m
ar
ke
t
LE
H
ID
m
ar
ke
t
R
at
in
gs
ar
ea
p-
va
lu
e
fo
rH
0:
id
en
tic
al
ef
fe
ct
of
in
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
on
bo
th
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
es
0.
30
0.
48
0.
58
0.
16
0.
30
N
ot
es
:A
ll
re
gr
es
sio
ns
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
by
th
e
ra
tin
gs
-a
re
a
po
pu
la
tio
n
un
de
r6
5,
as
re
po
rt
ed
by
th
e
U
S
C
en
su
s.
M
EP
S
M
SA
de
fin
iti
on
sb
re
ak
st
at
es
in
to
M
SA
sa
nd
st
at
e
re
sid
ua
ls
(i.
e.
,a
re
as
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
M
SA
s)
.A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
co
nt
ro
ls
in
th
e
ev
en
co
lu
m
ns
in
Ta
bl
e
2.
Re
gr
es
sio
ns
w
ith
a
LE
H
ID
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
e
al
so
co
nt
ro
lf
or
pl
an
ty
pe
sh
ar
es
,p
la
n
de
sig
n
fa
ct
or
,a
nd
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
fa
ct
or
.T
he
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
co
lu
m
n
6
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
M
SA
le
ve
l(
19
6
cl
us
te
rs
).
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
a p
<
0.
01
,b
p
<
0.
05
,c
p
<
0.
10
.
75
AM E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F H E A L T H E C O N OM I C S
to that in column 1) are not statistically significant at conventional levels in either column
2 or column 3. For both dependent variables, the coefficient estimates from specification
2 are near zero, although with 34 observations our standard errors are quite large and
two-sided tests of coefficient equality easily accept the null.
Column 4 repeats the analysis again using LEHID market definitions and premiums.
The LEHID specifications include controls for the underlying plan and enrollee charac-
teristics. These include plan design factor, which reflects the actuarial value of observed
plans in the relevant market, and demographic factor, a summary measure capturing
characteristics of the insured LEHID population (e.g., family size and gender).43
The point estimate in specification 1 is again two-thirds as large as our central estimate
and remains significant at p < 0.10. The coefficient estimate onHHI in specification 2 is
again near zero; there is no evidence thatHHI is significantly correlated with preperiod
LEHID premiums. Here, the coefficients from specifications 1 and 2 are distinguishable
at p = 0.16.
The other major concern raised above was our instrument conditions on insurers who
choose to participate in state HIMs. To address this point, we turn to the LEHID and In-
terStudy data sets, which allow us to construct measures of HHI using purely ex ante
estimates of market share. Column 4 replaces only the dependent variable with premiums
calculated from LEHID, and utilizes the LEHID market as the unit of observation. Col-
umn 5 also replaces HHI with a LEHID-based version that uses pre-exchange market
shares for all incumbents. The point estimates for specification 1 are virtually the same
as those reported in columns 1–4, although the standard error is larger in column 5.
In specification 2, there is no evidence that HHI is correlated with preperiod LEHID
premiums.
Finally, the last column of Table 3 usesHHI constructed from InterStudyMSAmar-
ket shares for all employers. We are only able to estimate specification 1, as we lack Inter-
Study premiumdata. The coefficient estimate is similar inmagnitude to the other columns
and statistically significant at p < 0.10.
In summary, there is some evidence (albeit weaker and noisier) that HHI is corre-
lated with 2L P S even when the data are aggregated to higher levels of geography. By con-
trast, there is no evidence thatHHI is correlated with pre-exchange premiums: the point
estimates in the falsification exercises in specification 2 are always near zero. However, the
coefficients from the exchange and pre-exchange periods are not statistically distinguish-
able from one another.We also find that substituting our version ofHHI with ameasure
that does not depend on incumbents’ exchange participation decisions has little impact on
the reduced-form point estimates.
B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Table 4 presents results of our reduced-form equation using other measures of premiums:
the mean premium across all silver plans offered in a ratings area; the median premium
43 We also include the market-level shares of plan types (Indemnity, Preferred Provider Organization,
HealthMaintenance Organization, and Point of Service), as well as the share of plans denoted as “consumer-
directed” (i.e., high-deductible plans).
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TABLE 4. Reduced-form effect of HHI on ln(prices) (robustness to
alternative measures of prices)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Dep var = Dep var = Dep var = ln(mean
var = ln(mean ln(median of within-insurer
ln(2LPS) premium) premium) mean premiums)
HHI 0.293a 0.162a 0.182a 0.175a
(0.079) (0.057) (0.062) (0.055)
ln(per capita income) −0.013 0.058 0.097b 0.061c
(0.053) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037)
ln(hospital price) 0.197a 0.169a 0.151a 0.161a
(0.043) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030)
CO-OP in market −0.079a −0.009 −0.002 0.000
(0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Share nonprofit −0.018 −0.032c −0.051a −0.018
(0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Percent black 0.260a 0.175a 0.218a 0.105b
(0.070) (0.050) (0.055) (0.049)
Percent Hispanic −0.187a 0.070c 0.131a 0.049
(0.054) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038)
R2 0.190 0.173 0.185 0.160
Notes: N = 383. All regressions are weighted by the ratings-area population under 65, as reported
by the US Census. Samples exclude Virginia, which has very large pricing outliers. When Virginia
is included, specifications utilizing a mean premium (i.e., columns 2 and 4) yield statistically
insignificant coefficients on HHI. Standard errors in parentheses. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05,
cp < 0.10.
across the silver plans; and the mean of within-insurer mean silver premium (i.e., a mean
calculated using one observation per insurer, so as to avoid overweighting insurers with
many plans). For this analysis, we exclude the state of Virginia, which has some extreme
premium outliers.44 The first column presents the results obtained using this sample and
our primary dependent variable, 2LPS. Our conclusions are robust to using these other
dependent variables. The point estimates are somewhat smaller, but the differences across
specifications are not statistically significant. There are a number of possible causes for the
smaller estimated magnitudes obtained using these alternative premium measures.
First, the alternative premium measures have smaller standard deviations than 2LPS,
suggesting that there is less variation to explain. Second, some of the variation in 2LPS is
related to the sheer number of plans offered in a ratings area. Even if plan premiums are in
expectation the same (e.g., drawn at random from the same distribution of prices), adding
44 Three Virginia insurers (Optima, Aetna, and Innovation Health) have premiums that are extreme out-
liers. The mean silver premium (for a 27-year-old) across these three insurers is 885. This compares to a
mean of 256 for the rest of the country.
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more plans will lower 2LPS without affecting many other measures of premiums. Third,
the coefficients could be interpreted as evidence that the effect of stronger competition is
particularly great for plans in the low-priced silver segment. Finally, one may also infer
that United’s larger impact on 2LPS implies it has a greater direct than indirect impact on
exchange premiums.
Table 4 also shows that CO-OPs are significantly related to 2LPS, but not to other
measures of premiums. We take this, along with the relatively large share (in Figure 5) of
markets in which CO-OPs are among the two lowest-price firms, as suggestive evidence
that CO-OPs are decreasing 2LPS more through the direct effect (i.e., by being one of the
two lowest-price firms in the market) than indirect effect (i.e., they may not—in the first
year—have inspired competitors to reduce their premiums.) Due to the potential endo-
geneity of CO-OP locations, and the lack of an instrument for their presence, the CO-OP
results aremerely suggestive. Additional research on the impact of CO-OPswould be valu-
able, as the budget compromise of January 2013 eliminated funding to support prospective
CO-OPs and slashed funds for current CO-OPs.45
Our results are robust to a series of other specification choices. In Online Appendix
Table 1, we present reduced-form results from models including several additional con-
trols (measured at the ratings-area level, except where otherwise noted), share of the pop-
ulation located in an urban area, share obese, share diabetic, whether a state is expanding
Medicaid, share aged less than 19, share uninsured, Medicare fee-for-service spending per
capita (to capture variation in utilization of health-care services), hospital market concen-
tration, and 2011 stateMLRs. Variable construction and sources are described in the notes
to Online Appendix Table 1. Adding these additional controls has a minimal impact on
the coefficients of interest. In Online Appendix Table 2, we present results from a series
of other specification choices: (1) excluding HIMs with five or more insurers; (2) adding
dummies for number of exchange insurers; (3) excluding the top and bottom 5 percent of
HHI; (4) excluding the top and bottom 5 percent of 2LPS; (5) allocating entrants 5 per-
cent share; and (6) including state fixed effects. The point estimates for the effect ofHHI
on 2LPS range from 0.151 to 0.669, with most remaining near 0.3 and all statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. Finally, we also estimate a reduced-form model replacing
HHI with United’s pre-exchange market share. This alternative instrument is also a sig-
nificant predictor of 2LPS (with p < 0.01), but the implied effect of United’s presence on
2LPS is smaller. The smaller estimated effect is expected given that share is a less accurate
indicator of United’s effect on market competition than predicted change in HHI.
VI. Conclusion
In this study, we evaluate the impact of insurer participation and competition in the
FFMs on premiums. We find that exchange premiums are responsive to competition. To
45 By December 2012, the federal government had awarded $2 billion in loans, out of $6 billion initially set
aside by ACA. In January 2013, Congress eliminated all but about $200 million of the remaining funds, and
this sum was designated to support the 24 CO-OPs already existing at that time. Thirteen of these CO-OPs
offered plans in 2014. Source: James (2013), “Health Policy Brief: The CO-OP Health Insurance Program”.
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contend with the endogeneity of exchange market structure, we exploit the decision by
United to forgo participation in the FFMs. This decision differentially impacted markets
due to United’s pre-exchange market position.
We estimate that the population-weighted average second-lowest silver premium
would have been reduced by 5.4 percent had United entered all markets. If all insurers
present in a state had entered all ratings areas in that state’s exchange, we predict FFM pre-
miums would have been 11.1 percent lower. We also find that markets with CO-OPs have
lower premiums. A portion of this association is attributable to a “direct effect” because
CO-OPs are often among the two lowest-price silver plans in a market; their premiums
directly lowered the weighted average 2LPS by 2.1 percent.46
The magnitude of the relationship between HHI and exchange premiums is roughly
one-third that obtained by Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) for the large-
employer-groupmarket. Although the estimates are not perfectly comparable (in particu-
lar, the Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) estimate reflects the cumulative effect
of changes in HHI on premium growth over a few years’ time), the similar order of magni-
tude suggests that the competitive dynamic characterizing early exchange markets is akin
to that of the mature, but imperfectly competitive, large-group market. This suggests that
HIMs have not (to date) produced a Bertrand-like outcome in which a small number of
players can drive premiums down to cost.
Future entry, firm learning, consumer learning, and greater plan standardization may
change this assessment. There is room for significant learning on both sides of this mar-
ket. For example, over time consumers are likely to learn how to better compare different
plan attributes, like premiums, actuarial value and network design. Tools to facilitate these
comparisons and to help consumers prioritize attributes will also improve. Changes in the
shapes of consumer demand curves will in turn affect pricing. Relatedly, insurers’ uncer-
tainty about who their competitors will be, what the pool of consumers will look like, and
what kinds of products will be attractive to those consumers will resolve. While impossi-
ble to sign definitively, most of these forces are likely to make the cross-price elasticities of
demand across insurers higher for a given market structure. Under these circumstances,
margins will decline faster with a move from one to two insurers. Once pricing nears the
competitive level, however, additional competitors will have a smaller incremental effect.
Given the incipiency of these markets, this study is but a first step in what will surely
become a deeper and broader literature on insurance HIMs and the nature and signifi-
cance of competition among exchange participants. There is substantial room for further
research on how competition affects pricing and other outcomes in this market. Future
studies will be easier to execute once information about consumer enrollment decisions
has been released, and once the market is in longer-term equilibrium. These conditions
will allow researchers to apply well-established supply-side methodologies to studying
competition on the HIMs. Such research will permit more-nuanced conclusions and rec-
ommendations regarding the impact of competition and competition-related policies on
various outcomes of interest. Given the large federal role in developing and regulating the
46 To obtain this estimate, we recalculated 2LPS without CO-OPs in the sample of markets with a CO-OP
and compared it to actual 2LPS.
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HIMs, and in subsidizing the purchase of plans offered on the HIMs, research on how
competition affects consumer choice and insurer behavior is of critical importance.
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